Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples by Rubinstein, Aviad et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
94
5v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  1
8 N
ov
 20
19
Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples
Aviad Rubinstein∗ Jack Z. Wang† S. Matthew Weinberg‡
Abstract
We study the single-choice Prophet Inequality problem when the gambler is given access
to samples. We show that the optimal competitive ratio of 1/2 can be achieved with a single
sample from each distribution. When the distributions are identical, we show that for any
constant ε > 0, O(n) samples from the distribution suffice to achieve the optimal competitive
ratio (≈ 0.745) within (1 + ε), resolving an open problem of [CDFS19].
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1 Introduction
Consider the classic single-choice Prophet Inequality problem. Offline, there are n distributions
D1, . . . ,Dn presented to a gambler. For i = 1 to n, a random variable Xi is drawn independently
from Di and revealed online. The gambler must then decide immediately and irrevocably whether
to accept Xi (and achieve reward Xi, ending the game), or reject Xi (continuing the game, but
never revisiting Xi again). The goal of the gambler is to devise a stopping rule which maximizes
their expected reward. The performance of potential stopping rules is typically measured by their
competitive ratio in comparison to a prophet (who knows all Xi in advance and achieves expected
reward E[maxi{Xi}]). Typically, prophet inequalities are designed assuming that the distributions
presented offline are fully known. This paper focuses on the setting where the gambler is instead
presented with offline samples from the Di, rather than complete knowledge.
In the classic setting, seminal work of Krengel and Sucheston provides a strategy guaranteeing a
competitive ratio of 1/2, which is the best possible [KS78].1 Samuel-Cahn later proved that simply
setting a threshold equal to the median of maxi{Xi} (i.e. a value T such that Pr[maxi{Xi} >
v] = 1/2) also achieves the optimal competitive ratio of 1/2 [Sam84], and it was later shown that
a threshold of E[maxi{Xi}]/2 suffices as well [KW12]. These last two thresholds are remarkably
simple, but certainly require a non-trivial number of samples to estimate well.
Our first result establishes that a single sample from each Di suffices to achieve the optimal com-
petitive ratio of 1/2. The algorithm is also exceptionally simple: if X˜1, . . . , X˜n denote independent
samples from D1, . . . ,Dn, simply set maxi{X˜i} as a threshold.
Definition 1 (Single Sample Algorithm). Given as input X˜1, . . . , X˜n, set a threshold T = maxi{X˜i}
and accept the first random variable exceeding T .
Theorem 1. The Single Sample Algorithm guarantees a competitive ratio of 1/2.
A subsequent line of works considers the special case where each Di is identical (which we’ll
refer to as D). Here, work of Hill and Kertz provided the first improved competitive ratio
(of 1 − 1/e) [HK82], and this was recently improved to the optimal competitive ratio of α ≈
0.745 [CFH+17]. Our second result establishes that a linear number of samples from D suf-
fices to achieve the optimal competitive ratio, up to ε. Since our algorithm simply replaces the
quantile-based thresholds of [CFH+17] with samples, we call it Samples-CFHOV (the five authors
of [CFH+17]). The algorithm and analysis are fairly simple and we provide a formal description in
Section 4.
Theorem 2. With O(n/ε6) samples, Samples-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of α−O(ε).
1.1 Related Work
Over the past decade, prophet inequalities have been studied from numerous angles within the TCS
community [CHMS10, Ala11, KW12, GHK+14, EHLM15, Rub16, FSZ16, RS17, DFKL17, EHKS18,
ACK18, AW18, CSZ19, ANSS19, GW19, DK19, CMT19]. All of these works assume explicit
knowledge of the given distributions. The limited prior work most related to ours considers sample
access to the underlying distributions. On this front, Azar et al. consider prophet inequalities
subject to combinatorial constraints, and establish that limited samples suffice to obtain constant
1To see that no better than 1/2 is possible, consider an instance where X1 is deterministically 1, and X2 is 1/ε
with probability ε, and 0 otherwise. The prophet achieves 2− ε (taking X2 when it is large, and X1 otherwise), while
the gambler achieves only 1 (they must decide whether to take X1 without knowing if X2 is large).
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competitive ratios in many settings [AKW14]. In comparison to this work, our paper considers
only optimal competitive ratios, and the simple single-choice setting.
In the i.i.d. model (each value is drawn from the same D), a (1− 1/e)-approximation was first
shown in [HK82], and recent work achieved the same guarantee with n−1 samples from D [CDFS19].
This ratio was later improved to ≈ 0.738 [AEE+17], and then to α ≈ 0.745 [CFH+17], where α is
the optimal achievable competitive ratio [HK82, Ker86]. The most related work in this sequence to
ours is [CDFS19], who establish that a competitive ratio of α− ε is achievable with O(n2) samples
(for any constant ε), and that Ω(n) samples are necessary. They also establish a formal barrier
to achieving α − ε with o(n2) samples. In comparison, we circumvent their barrier to achieve a
competitive ratio of α− ε with O(n) samples, resolving one of their open problems.
Roadmap. In Section 2, we provide brief preliminaries. Section 3 contains our 2-approximation
with a single sample. Section 4 contains our (α− ε)-approximation with linearly many samples.
2 Preliminaries
There are n distributions, D1, . . . ,Dn. Online, a gambler sees a random variable Xi drawn from
Di one at a time, and must immediately and irrevocably decide whether to accept (and get reward
Xi) or reject (and see Xi+1, throwing away Xi forever). Strategies for a gambler are often termed
stopping rules, and the competitive ratio of a stopping rule is the worst-case ratio (over all possible
n, and D1, . . . ,Dn) between its expected reward and E[maxi{Xi}].
Our algorithms will not have knowledge of any Di, but instead will have access to samples.
Our algorithms will treat these samples as the only offline input, and decide whether to accept or
reject an element based only on the value of that element and the samples.2 Here, we will count
the number of samples from each distribution as our sample complexity.
We will also consider the i.i.d. setting, where each Di = D. Here, we will count the total
number of samples from D as our sample complexity. In this setting, we will let α ≈ 0.745 denote
the optimal competitive ratio for an algorithm with knowledge of D.
Continuous vs. Discrete Random Variables. All of our algorithm definitions are straight-
forward for continuous distributions. For distributions with point masses, the following “reduction”
to continuous is needed. Instead of thinking of D as a single-variate distribution, we will (overload
notation and) think of D as a bivariate distribution with the first coordinate drawn from D, and the
second “tie-breaker” coordinate drawn independently and uniformly from [0, 1]. Then (X1, t1) >
(X2, t2) if either X1 > X2, or X1 = X2 and t1 > t2. Observe that because the tie-breaker coordinate
is continuous, the probability of having (X1, t1) = (X2, t2) for any two values during a run of any
algorithm is zero. Therefore, if we define FD(X, t) := Pr(Y,u)←(D,U([0,1]))[(Y, u) < (X, t)], we have
that FD(X, t) < FD(Y, u)⇔ (X, t) < (Y, u). We will not explicitly reference this tie-breaker random
variable in the definition of our algorithms, but simply refer to X ← D as the pair (X, t).
Adversaries. Prophet Inequalities are typically studied against an offline adversary. That is,
the adversary simply picks the distributions D1, . . . ,Dn (and their indices), which is all presented to
the gambler offline. Some prophet inequalities hold against the stronger almighty adversary, which
selects the set of distributions {D1, . . . ,Dn} offline, then decides in which order to reveal the random
variables X1, . . . ,Xn based on their realization. Note that previous competitive ratios of 1/2 in
the non-i.i.d. setting hold against an almighty adversary, and Theorem 1 does as well. Previous
2In principle, sample-based algorithms might also consider previously viewed elements, but our algorithms don’t.
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competitive ratios of α in the i.i.d. setting hold against the offline adversary (and are impossible to
achieve against the almighty adversary), so Theorem 2 holds against the offline adversary as well.
3 The Non-I.I.D. Case: Optimal Ratio with a Single Sample from
Each Di
The Single Sample Algorithm proceeds as follows. It takes as input X˜i drawn independently from
each Di, sets a threshold T = maxi{X˜i}, and accepts the first element exceeding T . Our goal in
this section is to prove Theorem 1 that this algorithm obtains 12 the reward, in expectation, of the
omniscient prophet that always selects the highest value.
Our analysis will use the principle of deferred decisions: instead of first drawing the samples X˜ ,
and then revealing the actual draws X, we will jointly draw 2n samples Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, and
then for each i randomly decide which of {Yi, Zi} is equal to X˜i and which is equal to Xi. Formally,
consider the following Deferred-Decisions procedure for drawing X, X˜ :
1. Draw Y1, . . . , Yn and Z1, . . . , Zn independently each from D1, . . . ,Dn.
2. For ease of notation later, for all i, relabel so that Yi > Zi.
3. Independently, flip n fair coins. If coin i is heads, set Xi := Yi and X˜i := Zi. Otherwise, set
Xi := Zi and X˜i := Yi.
Observation 3. The output of the Deferred-Decisions procedure correctly generates X˜1, . . . , X˜n
and X1, . . . ,Xn as independent draws from D1, . . . ,Dn.
Our analysis will proceed by directly comparing, for any fixed Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, the ex-
pected reward of the gambler over the randomness in the coin flips of step three to the expected
reward of the prophet over the randomness in the coin flips of step three. We note that this analysis
is similar to that of the rehearsal algorithm of [AKW14] for k-uniform matroids (whose competitive
ratio is asymptotically optimal for large k), and that prior to this it was folklore knowledge that the
Single Sample Algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of at least 1/4. The novelty in our analysis
is precisely nailing down the tight competitive ratio.
3.1 Analysis Setup
For a fixed Y1, . . . , Yn, Z1, . . . , Zn, sort the values into descending order, and relabel them as
W1, . . . ,W2n. If Wj is equal to Yi (or Zi), we say that Wj comes from i, and denote this with
index(Wj) = i. Call the pivotal index j
∗ the minimum j such that there exists an ℓ > j with
index(Wℓ) = index(Wj). That is, the pivotal index j
∗ is such that there are exactly j∗ − 1 Y
random variables exceeding the largest Z random variable.
Our analysis will make use of the following concept: for each W1, . . . ,Wj∗−1, let Cj denote the
outcome of the coinflip for index(Wj) (which assigns either Yi or Zi to arrive as a sample and the
other to arrive as a real value). Observe, importantly, that the random variables C1, . . . , Cj∗−1
are independent (because they are independent coin flips for different indices). Also importantly,
observe that the random variable Cj∗ is deterministic conditioned on C1, . . . , Cj∗−1 (because it is
exactly the same coin flip as one of the earlier indices).
3
3.2 The Prophet’s Expected Reward
Proposition 4. For fixed W1, . . . ,W2n and pivotal index j
∗, the prophet’s expected reward, over
the randomness in the coin flips of step three, is
∑j∗−1
j=1 Wj/2
j +Wj∗/2
j∗−1.
Proof. Observe that the prophet achieves expected reward equal to maxi{Xi}, so we just want to
compute the probability that this is W1, . . . ,W2n. For each j < j
∗, Wj is equal to maxi{Xi} if and
only if Cj is heads, and Cℓ is tails for all ℓ < j (recall that all Wj ’s are Y random variables for
j < j∗). Because each of the coin flips are independent, this occurs with probability precisely 1/2j .
For j∗, Wj∗ is equal to maxi{Xi} if and only if Cℓ is tails for all ℓ < j
∗, and coin Cj∗ is tails.
Observe, however, that by definition of the pivotal index j∗, that when Cℓ is tails for all ℓ < j
∗ we
have Cj∗ as tails as well (because it is the same coin as one of the first j
∗−1). Therefore, whenever
all of the first j∗ − 1 coins are tails, maxi{Xi} =Wj∗ (and this happens with probability 1/2
j∗−1).
As the first j∗ − 1 coins either contain some heads, or are all tails (and we have counted the
prophet’s reward in all such cases), we have now fully accounted for the prophet’s expected reward
over the randomness in the coin flips.
3.3 The Single Sample Algorithm’s Expected Reward
Proposition 5. For fixed W1, . . . ,W2n and pivotal index j
∗, the gambler’s expected reward, over
the randomness in the coin flips of step three, is at least
∑j∗−2
j=1 Wj/2
j+1 +Wj∗−1/2
j∗−1.
Proof. Consider the case where C1 is tails. In this case, the gambler gets no reward because
the threshold is higher than all revealed elements. For j < j∗ − 1, consider next the case where
C1, . . . , Cj are heads, but Cj+1 is tails. In this case, the gambler gets reward at least Wj (because
the gambler will accept the first non-sample random variable exceeding Wj+1, and these random
variables have values W1, . . . ,Wj). The probability that this occurs is exactly 1/2
j+1.
Consider also the case where C1, . . . , Cj∗−1 are all heads. Then the threshold is set at Wj∗, and
the gambler will get at least Wj∗−1. This occurs with probability exactly 1/2
j∗−1.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We can immediately see that:
j∗−2∑
j=1
Wj/2
j+1 +Wj∗−1/2
j∗−1 ≥
j∗−1∑
j=1
Wj/2
j+1 +Wj∗/2
j∗
=
1
2
·


j∗−1∑
j=1
Wj/2
j +Wj∗/2
j∗−1

 .
By Propositions 4 and 5, the right-hand side is exactly half the prophet’s expected reward, con-
ditioned on W1, . . . ,W2n and j
∗, and the left-hand side is exactly the gambler’s expected reward
(again conditioned on W1, . . . ,W2n and j
∗). As the gambler achieves half the prophet’s expected
reward for all W1, . . . ,W2n and j
∗, the guarantee holds in expectation as well.
4 The I.I.D. Case: Optimal Ratio with Linear Samples from D
We begin with a brief overview of the algorithm from [CFH+17] and its main features, followed by
a formal specification of our algorithm.
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4.1 Overview of [CFH+17] and Samples-CFHOV
The algorithm of [CFH+17] (with one slight modification due to [CDFS19]) proceeds as follows.
We’ll refer to this algorithm as Explicit-CFHOV.
1. As a function only of n, and independently of D, define monotone increasing probabilities
0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . pn ≤ 1.
2. For all i such that pi ≤ δ = ε
2/n, update pi := 0 (this is the [CDFS19] modification).
3. Accept Xi if and only if FD(Xi) > 1 − pi. Observe that this is identical to accepting Xi if
and only if Xi > σi = F
−1
D (1− pi). Also observe that Xi exceeds σi with probability pi.
Theorem 6 ([CFH+17, CDFS19]). In the i.i.d. setting, Explicit-CFHOV has competitive ratio
α− ε.3
That is, Explicit-CFHOV sets, for each i ∈ [n], a probability pi independent of D, and sets a
threshold σi for accepting Xi which is exceeded with probability exactly pi.
If instead of explicit access to D, we’re givenm i.i.d. samples fromD, the challenge is simply that
we can no longer compute FD(Xi) exactly and run Explicit-CFHOV. The algorithm of [CDFS19]
observes that m = O(n2) samples suffices to estimate the quantiles sufficiently well. Our algorithm
observes that in fact m = O(n) samples suffice (which is asymptotically tight, by a lower bound
in [CDFS19]). Our algorithm proceeds as follows, which we call Samples-CFHOV.
1. As a function only of n, and independently of D, define monotone increasing probabil-
ities 0 ≤ p1 ≤ . . . pn ≤ 1, exactly as in Explicit-CFHOV.
2. Round down each pi to the nearest integer power of (1 + ε); we denote the rounded value by
⌊pi⌋ ∈ {(1 + ε)
−1, (1 + ε)−2 . . . }.
3. Set p˜i := ⌊pi⌋/(1+ε) (that is, we have rounded down each pi, then further divided by (1+ε)).
4. From our m samples, let τi denote the value of the (p˜i ·m)-th highest sample.
5. Accept Xi if and only if Xi > τi.
That is, Samples-CFHOV provides an estimate τi of σi via the m samples. Intuitively, we are
trying to overestimate σi so that it is unlikely that Samples-CFHOV will ever choose to accept an
element that Explicit-CFHOV would not. We’ll prove Theorem 2 as a corollary of Theorem 7:
Theorem 7. For any distribution D, with m = O(n/ε6) samples, the expected value achieved by
Samples-CFHOV is at least a (1−O(ε))-fraction of that of Explicit-CFHOV.
We briefly remark that our proof of Theorem 7 actually holds for any choice of pi’s (all /∈ (0, δ)).
That is, if Explicit-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of γ(~p) with a particular choice of ~p,
Samples-CFHOV achieves a competitive ratio of γ(~p)−O(ε) (as long as each pi /∈ (0, δ)).
3Without step two, the algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of α.
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4.2 Brief Comparison to [CDFS19]
The algorithm employed by [CDFS19] using O(n2) samples is conceptually similar in that they
also wish to set thresholds τi such that FD(τi) ≈ 1 − pi. The main difference is that we target a
multiplicative (1−ε)-approximation to each, whereas they target an additive 1/n-approximation for
each threshold. That is, they aim to ensure that for each pi, the threshold τi has |FD(τi)−pi| ≤ 1/n.
They prove, using the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz Inequality, that O(n2) samples suffice for this,
then further argue that these small additive errors in the CDF don’t cost much.
The same paper also establishes a barrier to moving beyond Ω(n2) samples. Specifically, they
establish that Ω(n2) samples are necessarily just to guarantee for a single i with pi ≈ 1/2 that
|FD(τi) − pi| ≤ 1/n. Our approach circumvents this bound by seeking a significantly weaker
guarantee for such i (only that |FD(τi) − pi| ≤ O(εpi) — see Equation (1)). So the two key
differences in our approach is (a) we show that O(n) samples suffice to learn the thresholds up
to a multiplicative (1 + ε) error in the CDF and (b) establishing that this (significantly weaker)
estimation suffices for a good approximation.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Our proof breaks down into two simple claims. The first establishes that with high probability, our
sample-based thresholds are “good.” The second establishes that “good” thresholds yield a good
approximation. Below, recall that δ = ε2/n.
Lemma 8. With m = 12 ln(1/ε)/(ε3δ) = O(n/ε6) samples, with probability at least 1− ε, we have
that for every i (simultaneously),
pi
(1 + ε)3
≤ Pr
x∼D
[x > τi] ≤ pi. (1)
Note that Equation (1) does not reference the values of the actual elements X1, . . . ,Xn at all —
it is just a claim about the thresholds ~τ being set. That is, the probability 1− ε is taken only over
the randomness in drawing the samples (and in particular independent of the values of the actual
elements). We will call a set of thresholds “good” if they satisfy Equation (1).
Proof. Recall that τi is set by first rounding down pi to ⌊pi⌋, then further dividing by (1+ ε) to p˜i,
then set equal to the (p˜i ·m)-th highest of m samples. To proceed, let Li be such that
Pr
x∼D
[x > Li] = ⌊pi⌋.
Similarly, let Hi be such that
Pr
x∼D
[x > Hi] = (1 + ε)
−2⌊pi⌋.
Then (1) certainly holds whenever Li < τi < Hi. The remainder of the proof establishes that we
are likely to have Li < τi < Hi for all i.
Indeed, observe that we expect to see ⌊pi⌋m samples greater than Li. We say that ⌊pi⌋ is bad
if the number of samples greater than Li is not in the range
[
(1 + ε)−1(⌊pi⌋m), (1 + ε)(⌊pi⌋m)
]
.
Note that whenever neither ⌊pi⌋ nor (1 + ε)
−2⌊pi⌋ is bad, then we indeed have Li < τi < Hi.
Because the number of samples greater than p is an average of m independent {0, 1} random
variables with expectation p, the multiplicative Chernoff bound implies that the the probability
that a particular p is bad is upper bounded by:
Pr[p is bad] < e−ε
2pm/3.
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If all p ∈ {(1+ε)−1, . . . , δ} are not bad, then our desired claim holds. Taking union bound over this
(1 + ε)-multiplicative net, we have that the probability that some p ∈ {(1 + ε)−1, (1 + ε)−2 . . . , δ}
is bad is bounded by:
O(ln(1/δ)/ε)∑
i=0
e−ε
2(1−ε)−iδm/3 ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−ε
2(1−ε)−iδm/3 ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−ε
3iδm/6 ≤ e−ε
3δm/12
Above, the first term is simply a union bound over all p in this net. The second inequality
follows as (1 − ε)−i ≥ εi/2 for all ε ∈ (0, 1) and i ≥ 0. The final inequality holds (at least) when
m ≥ 6/(ε3δ). Therefore, setting m = 12 ln(1/ε)/(ε3δ) satisfies the desired claim.
Next, we wish to show that whenever the thresholds are “good”, the algorithm performs well in
expectation. Below, let t1 denote the stopping time of Explicit-CFHOV (i.e. the random variable
denoting the element it chooses to accept), and let t2 denote the stopping time of Samples-CFHOV.
Claim 9. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, t2 ≥ t1. That is, Samples-CFHOV selects an
element later than Explicit-CFHOV.
Proof. For every i, we have that by (1), the threshold used by Samples-CFHOV is at least the
threshold used by Explicit-CFHOV. Therefore, the first time they deviate (if any) is when Explicit-
CFHOV accepts an element but Samples-CFHOV does not.
Lemma 10. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, the following holds for every v:
Pr[Xt2 > v] ≥
1
(1 + ε)3
Pr[Xt1 > v]. (2)
Proof. We prove that (2) holds uniformly for every i ∈ [n], i.e.
Pr[(Xt2 > v) ∧ (t2 = i)] ≥
1
(1 + ε)3
Pr[(Xt1 > v) ∧ (t1 = i)]. (3)
The event (Xtb > v)∧(tb = i) (for either b ∈ {1, 2}) occurs if and only if the corresponding algorithm
doesn’t stop before i, and Xi is larger than both v and the threshold set (by the corresponding
algorithm). Of course, whether or not an algorithm stops before i is completely independent of Xi.
We claim that the following holds on the probability that the two algorithms accept Xi (conditioned
on making it to Xi). Intuitively, Claim 11 establishes that, even though the threshold τi is stricter
than σi, we are still roughly as likely to accept an Xi exceeding v using τi versus σi, for all v.
Claim 11. Conditioned on (1) holding for every i, then for every v and i such that pi ≥ δ:
(1 + ε)3 Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] ≥ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)].
Proof. We consider the following three cases: perhaps v > τi, or perhaps v ∈ (σi, τi), or perhaps
v < σi. We claim that the following three inequalities hold:
v ≥ τi ⇒ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] = Pr[Xi > v] = Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)].
v ∈ (σi, τi)⇒ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)] ≤ Pr[Xi > σi] ≤
Pr[Xi > τi]
(1 + ε)3
=
Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)]
(1 + ε)3
.
v < σi ⇒ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)] = Pr[Xi > σi] ≤
Pr[Xi > τi]
(1 + ε)3
=
Pr[(Xi > τi) ∧ (Xi > v)]
(1 + ε)3
.
Indeed, the first implication follows as v exceeds both σi and τi. The second implication follows
as v > σi, and then by condition (1). The third implication follows from condition (1).
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Claim 11 is the heart of the proof, and we can now wrap up. Observe that Pr[(Xt2 > v)∧ (t2 =
i)] = Pr[t2 ≥ i] · Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)]. Similarly, Pr[(Xt1 > v) ∧ (t1 = i)] = Pr[t1 ≥ i] ·Pr[(Xi >
v) ∧ (Xi > σi)]. By the work above, (1 + ε)
3 Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > τi)] ≥ Pr[(Xi > v) ∧ (Xi > σi)].
By Claim 9, Pr[t2 ≥ i] ≥ Pr[t1 ≥ i]. Therefore, we’ve proven the desired claim for every i ∈ [n]. As
Pr[Xtb > v] =
∑
i Pr[(Xtb > v) ∧ (tb = i)], this completes the proof of Lemma 10.
Proof of Theorem 7. The proof of Theorem 7 now follows as a direct corollary of Lemmas 8 and 10.
Lemma 10 asserts that whenever the thresholds are “good”, Samples-CFHOV achieves at least a
1/(1+ ε)3 fraction of the expected reward of Explicit-CFHOV (this is because the expected reward
of Samples-CFHOV is simply
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt2 > v]dv ≥
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt1 > v]dv/(1 + ε)
3, and the expected
reward of Explicit-CFHOV is precisely
∫∞
0 Pr[Xt2 > v]dv). Lemma 8 asserts that the thresholds
are good with probability at least 1− ε. So together, Samples-CFHOV achieves at least a 1−ε
(1+ε)3
of
the expected reward of Explicit-CFHOV.
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